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Does	Merkel’s	coalition	spat	prefigure	a	change	in	the
German	party	system?
The	alliance	between	Angela	Merkel’s	CDU	and	their	Bavarian	sister	party,	the	CSU,	has	come	under
strain	over	the	German	government’s	immigration	policies.	Ben	Margulies	writes	that	while	most	of	the
coverage	of	the	CDU-CSU	dispute	has	focused	on	what	it	means	for	Merkel’s	government,	it	provides
some	insights	into	the	potential	future	trajectory	of	the	German	party	system.
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In	the	ten	months	since	the	last	German	federal	election,	many	political	observers	have	concluded	that	Angela
Merkel’s	time	as	the	leader	of	Germany	and	Europe	may	be	coming	to	an	end.	Her	conservative	coalition	won	a
dismal	33	percent	of	the	vote	in	September	2017;	forced	into	another	“grand	coalition”	with	the	reluctant	Social
Democrats	(SPD)	after	protracted	negotiations,	her	new	government	only	took	office	in	March.	Three	months	later,
one	of	its	constituent	parties	nearly	brought	down	her	government	over	immigration	controls.	Though	many
onlookers	will	be	wondering	what	this	means	for	Chancellor	Merkel,	it	is	also	worth	looking	at	what	it	means	for	the
German	party	system,	and	for	the	structure	of	European	politics.
Germany’s	main	conservative/Christian-democratic	“party”,	the	CDU/CSU,	is	a	coalition	of	two	parties.	The	Christian
Democratic	Union	(the	CDU	part)	operates	in	15	of	Germany’s	16	states	–	this	is	Merkel’s	party.	The	Christian	Social
Union	(the	CSU	part)	operates	in	Bavaria	alone,	preserving	its	regional	identity	and	Bavaria’s	especially	strong
attachment	to	the	Roman	Catholic	Church.	The	two	parties	operate	together	in	federal	elections;	the	CDU	usually
provides	the	common	candidate	for	chancellor.
The	refugee	crisis	of	2015,	and	Merkel’s	decision	to	open	Germany’s	borders,	led	to	a	serious	breach	between	the
CDU	and	CSU.	The	CSU	demanded	a	cap	on	the	number	of	refugees	admitted	annually	during	the	2017-18	coalition
negotiations.	Finally,	in	June	2018,	the	CSU	interior	minister,	Horst	Seehofer,	unveiled	a	plan	that	would	allow
Germany	to	unilaterally	turn	back	asylum-seekers	at	the	border	so	long	as	they	were	registered	in	another	EU	state.
Merkel	refused	any	unilateral	actions,	seeking	an	EU	agreement	on	migration.	Seehofer	threatened	to	order	these
exclusions	anyway,	and	offered	his	resignation	on	1	July,	despite	Merkel	gaining	some	concessions	from	other
European	states	on	returning	asylum-seekers.	Only	a	last-minute	deal	saved	the	alliance.
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For	Merkel,	the	CSU’s	withdrawal	would	have	meant	an	end	to	the	parliamentary	majority	for	her	fourth	government,
meaning	she	would	either	have	had	to	find	a	new	coalition	partner	(likely	the	Greens	or	the	FDP)	or	seek	new
elections.	But	the	CSU’s	threatened	withdrawal	over	the	immigration	issue	also	suggests	deeper	changes	to	the
German	party	system,	changes	that	reflect	phenomena	elsewhere	in	Europe.
Historically,	German	politics	has	been	organised	around	two	main	“cleavages”	or	institutionalised	conflicts.	The	first
is	between	the	secular	and	the	religious,	which	is	why	Germany’s	main	right-wing	parties	are	“Christian”.	The
second,	common	to	almost	all	Western	European	states,	is	between	labour	and	the	bourgeoisie,	the	class,
socioeconomic	or	“left-right”	cleavage	–	the	CDU/CSU	and	the	Free	Democrats	were	bourgeois,	and	the	Social
Democrats	working	class.	The	rise	of	environmentalism	and	social	liberalism	brought	in	the	Greens.
Many	scholars	described	the	Greens	as	part	of	a	“new	politics”	focused	on	“post-materialist”	issues	relating	to	the
environment,	individual	rights	and	autonomy	and	democracy.	More	recently,	this	“new	politics”	dimension	has
become	part	of	a	larger	social	argument	about	whether	a	society	is,	to	borrow	Emmanuel	Macron’s	phrase,	“open”	or
“closed”	–	that	is,	whether	a	nation	embraces	globalisation	of	goods	and	people,	social	and	political	liberalism,	and
transnational	governance,	or	whether	it	seeks	hard	borders,	a	more	closed	economy,	national	sovereignty	and	a
homogenous,	illiberal	society.	In	Europe,	Hooghe	and	Marks	argue	that	we	are	seeing	“a	new	transnational	cleavage
that	has	at	its	core	a	cultural	conflict	pitting	libertarian,	universalistic	values	against	the	defence	of	nationalism	and
particularism”.
This	new	cleavage	has	been	reshaping	European	politics	and	party	systems.	In	France,	it	marks	the	key	difference
between	the	two	presidential	contenders	in	the	2017	presidential	run-off	–	the	cosmopolitan	Macron	vs.	the
communitarian	Le	Pen.	Macron’s	party,	La	République	En	Marche!,	effectively	dominates	the	cosmopolitan	side	of
the	conflict,	while	Le	Pen’s	Rassemblement	National	covers	the	anti-immigrant	(or	populist	radical-right)	wing	of	the
anti-liberals,	and	La	France	Insoumise	the	left-populist	challenge.	The	old	left-	and	right-wing	parties,	the	Socialists
and	the	Republicans,	are	severely	weakened.
In	Germany,	the	traditional	party	system	seemed	much	more	stable,	because	for	a	long	time,	Germany	had	no
successful	radical-right	party.	But	since	the	middle	part	of	this	decade,	the	Alternative	for	Germany	(Alternative	für
Deutschland,	AfD)	has	emerged	to	take	this	role.	It	has	tended	to	draw	non-voters,	far-right	voters,	and	defectors
from	the	centre-right	(and	centre-left,	sometimes)	to	its	ranks.	As	no	mainstream	party	will	ally	with	the	Europhobic
AfD,	its	emergence	has	forced	mainstream	German	parties	that	are	usually	enemies	to	form	coalitions,	both	at	the
state	level	and	now	federally	via	the	CDU/CSU-SPD	coalition.	This,	in	turn,	reinforces	the	idea	that	the	real	battle	in
German	politics	is	between	cosmopolitans	and	anti-cosmopolitans.
As	this	conflict	grows,	some	of	the	formerly	mainstream	parties	have	redefined	themselves	as	more	hostile	to
immigration,	rearranging	the	party	system	as	they	go.	Although	Hooghe	and	Marks	note	that	established	parties	tend
to	be	slow	to	adapt	themselves	to	novel	issues	and	cleavages,	it	does	seem	that	mainstream	parties	are	taking
clearer	views	on	the	globalisation-nationalism	spectrum,	especially	regarding	the	issues	of	immigration	and	border
security.	To	again	use	France	as	an	example,	the	French	centre-right	‘Republicans’,	have	been	adopting	ever
harsher	stances	towards	immigrants	since	Nicolas	Sarkozy	was	a	minister	in	the	2000s.	Now	that	Macron	has
effectively	monopolised	cosmopolitanism,	The	Republicans	have	begun	to	use	more	radical-right	populist	language
under	their	new	leader,	Laurent	Wauquiez.
What	is	interesting	about	the	German	situation	is	that	the	centre-right	is	not	taking	a	unified	stance	on	this	new
demarcation-integration	cleavage.	Merkel,	leader	of	the	Christian	Democrats,	is	maintaining	a	strong	commitment	to
Europe	and	to	being	relatively	open	to	immigrants.	The	CSU	are	adopting	a	much	more	restrictionist,	closed	policy.
The	German	liberal	party,	the	Free	Democrats,	have	also	hinted	at	greater	hostility	to	immigrants	(or	at	least	their
current	leader	has),	and	some	hostility	to	any	Eurozone	reform	that	might	lead	to	Germany	transferring	money
elsewhere.
What	does	this	mean	for	the	German	party	system?	What	we’ve	seen	in	France	is	a	near-total	realignment	of	the
party	system	along	the	closed-open	divide.	In	Germany,	a	split	between	the	CDU	and	CSU	would	certainly	seem	to
presage	a	similar	reshuffling	of	the	party	system.	The	fact	that	the	CDU,	SPD	and	Greens	all	hold	roughly	centrist
positions	on	socioeconomic	issues	and	are	committed	to	Europe	create	the	basis	for	a	“cosmopolitan”	camp.	On	the
“protectionist”	side,	things	are	more	unsettled.	The	AfD	is	clearly	there.	The	CSU	and	the	FDP	are	somewhere
between	the	AfD’s	position	on	borders	and	community	and	the	centrist	parties,	since	parties	are	slow	to	make	major
changes	in	their	policies	and	identities.
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It	is	also	possible	that	the	CDU	could	shift	right	as	the	CSU	is	doing.	Merkel	is	unpopular	among	right-wingers	within
its	ranks,	some	of	whom	–	notably	Jens	Spahn,	her	health	minister	–	could	pull	the	party	to	the	right.	That	said,	the
rift	between	the	CDU	and	CSU	over	this	issue	could	complicate	such	a	manoeuvre.
The	key	questions	for	Germany’s	future,	then,	are	first,	who	replaces	Merkel,	and	second,	whether	the	CSU	and	Free
Democrats	(and	maybe	the	CDU)	move	further	towards	the	AfD,	or	whether	the	AfD	remains	alone	on	the	right-wing
protectionist	fringe.	If	they	do,	the	party	system	would	totally	realign,	to	the	point	where	the	three	of	them	together
could	form	a	governing	coalition	of	populists,	as	in	Italy.	If	not,	we’d	continue	to	see	Germany	dominated	by	a	cluster
of	four	or	five	mainstream	parties,	but	parties	which	become	increasingly	hard	to	distinguish	as	“left”	or	“right”
because	the	AfD’s	presence	forces	them	to	make	novel	coalition	alliances.	Either	way,	the	prized	stability	of	German
politics	has	become	part	of	Germany’s	crowded	past.	Unlike	other	aspects	of	German	history,	it	will	be	very	much
missed.
Please	read	our	comments	policy	before	commenting.
Note:	This	article	gives	the	views	of	the	author,	not	the	position	of	EUROPP	–	European	Politics	and	Policy	or	the
London	School	of	Economics.
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